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The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions and a handful of legislative
enactments.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
During the Survey period, several cases addressed sovereign immunity.
In City of El Paso v. High Ridge Construction, a contractor brought a
breach of contract claim against the city relating to a conservation ser-
vices contract.1 The trial court denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction.
On appeal, the contractor argued that the city was not entitled to sover-
eign immunity based on the “proprietary-dichotomy” applied to cities,
for example, under the Tort Claims Act.2 Recognizing that the Texas Su-
preme Court expressed doubt the dichotomy applied to contract claims in
Tooke v. City of Mexia, the El Paso Court of Appeals examined the inter-
play between the Tort Claims Act, which addresses waiver in certain in-
stances, and the source of the city’s immunity.3 Noting disagreement in
the appellate decisions, the El Paso Court of Appeals followed its sister
courts in San Antonio and Amarillo in holding that “we must begin our
analysis with the presumption that the City is immune from suit for
breach of contract.”4 Starting from that proposition, the court of appeals
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1. City of El Paso v. High Ridge Constr., 442 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2014, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 666–67.
3. Id. (discussing Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006), in which
the Texas Supreme Court observed, “[W]e have never held that this same distinction deter-
mines whether immunity from suit is waived for breach of contract claims.”).
4. Id. at 667 (following City of San Antonio ex rel. City Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Whee-
labrator Air Pollution Control, Inc., 381 S.W.3d 597, 603–04 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2012, pet. denied), abrogated by Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d
71
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analyzed whether the contractor’s agreement, under which it provided
services to city residents rather than the city itself, was sufficient to in-
voke the limited waiver of immunity under Chapter 271 of the Local
Government Code, and ultimately determined it was not.5 The court of
appeals therefore remanded to give the contractor the opportunity to
cure and plead facts supporting a waiver of the city’s immunity as to the
contract claim.6
Humana Insurance Company v. Mueller and several other cases in the
Survey period addressed the extent to which governmental immunity ap-
plies to agents, contractors, or other third parties. In Mueller, plaintiff
brought claims against a third-party administrator of a governmental self-
funded health plan.7 The third-party administrator asserted governmental
immunity as an agent of a governmental unit by plea to the jurisdiction,
which the trial court denied. On interlocutory appeal, plaintiff argued
there was no appellate jurisdiction under § 51.014 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code.8 The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, not-
ing that subsection (a)(8) applied to governmental units, and because the
third-party administrator was seeking protection under a governmental
unit’s immunity, there was jurisdiction over the appeal. Turning to the
basis for immunity, the court of appeals examined Chapter 2259 of the
Government Code governing a governmental unit’s establishment of
health plans, and found providing a health plan is not a proprietary func-
tion and does not waive immunity. The court of appeals therefore held
that the immunity of the governmental unit extended to the third-party
administrator of the plan.9
Whether sovereign immunity extends to a county toll road authority’s
contractor was at issue in Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Olivares.10
The defendant engineering firm was hired to design and construct a toll
road. In 2007, a drunk driver sped over eight miles down the toll road
going the wrong way, resulting in a crash with an oncoming vehicle killing
both drivers. The parents of one of the drivers sued the contractor for
failure to design and install appropriate signs and traffic devices. The con-
tractor filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that it was immune from
suit and liability as an employee of the toll road authority.11 The trial
court granted the plea, the court of appeals disagreed, and the issue was
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. After tracing the origins of immu-
427 (Tex. 2016); Republic Power Partners, L.P. v. City of Lubbock, 424 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2014, no pet.), abrogated by Wasson Interests, Ltd., 489 S.W.3d 427).
5. Id. at 668–70.
6. Id. at 676.
7. Humana Ins. Co. v. Mueller, No. 04–14–00752–CV, 2015 WL 1938657, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
8. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West 2015) (providing for interloc-
utory appeal of specified orders).
9. Mueller, 2015 WL 1938657, at *5 (discussing Foster v. Teacher Retirement Sys., 273
S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.), which also held that immunity extends
to a governmental plan’s third-party administrator).
10. 461 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. 2015).
11. Id. at 119–20.
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nity and reviewing federal and lower state court opinions, the supreme
court observed that, in these cases, “the complained-of conduct for which
the contractor was immune was effectively attributed to government.
That is, the alleged cause of the injury was not the independent action of
the contractor, but the action taken by the government through the con-
tractor.”12 Focusing on the government’s level of control over a private
contractor’s work, the supreme court explained that “no control is deter-
minative,” and held that immunity does not extend to private contractors
“exercising independent discretion.”13
Justice Hecht, joined by Justices Willett and Guzman, wrote a concur-
ring opinion, in which he proffered a supposedly simple syllogism: “Im-
munity protects the government. An independent contractor is not the
government. Therefore, immunity does not protect an independent con-
tractor.”14 Even under this approach, however, immunity could extend to
private contractors under certain circumstances: “An independent con-
tractor may act as the government, in effect becoming the government for
limited purposes, and when it does, it should be entitled to the govern-
ment’s immunity.”15 Further, “insofar as [the contractor] is simply imple-
menting the government’s decisions it is entitled to the government’s
immunity. . . . [T]he ultimate issue is whether the independent contractor
is actually authorized by the government to act in its place.”16 Given that
the majority limited its holding to instances where there was no control
over the contractor, coupled with the potential applications in the concur-
rence, Brown & Gay Engineering leaves open the question of whether
governmental immunity could extend to a private contractor under an
appropriate set of facts.
In City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, Ingleside sued Corpus
Christi over an ordinance that set the boundary between the Ingleside
and Corpus Christi.17 Ingleside sought a declaration that the term “shore-
line” in the ordinance delineating the common boundary included fix-
tures on the shore. Corpus Christi filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which
the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s de-
nial of the plea, holding that “selection of a political subdivision’s bound-
ary is a ‘purely political question . . . not subject to judicial review.’”18
12. Id. at 125.
13. Id. at 124, 126. The supreme court distinguished Foster v. Teacher Retirement Sys-
tem, in which a private company serving as the third-party administrator for the Teacher
Retirement System’s self-funded health plan was granted immunity. Id. at 127 (distinguish-
ing Foster, 273 S.W.3d 883). The supreme court noted that even though the third-party
administrator had discretion to interpret the plan document, its duties were still described
as essentially ministerial in helping the governmental unit administer the plan. Id. Factors
that supported extension of immunity in Foster were the terms of the contract between the
state agency and the contractor and the “direct implication of state funds in that case” by
virtue of the governmental unit self-funding claims for health benefits. Id.
14. Id. at 129 (Hecht, J., concurring).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 130.
17. City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2015).
18. Id. at 590.
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The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, explaining there was a distinction
between a claim seeking to select or change a municipal boundary, on
one hand, and a claim seeking interpretation of a term in an ordinance
that indisputably sets the cities’ common boundary, on the other. In sup-
port, the supreme court cited Texas courts’ adjudications of various types
of boundary disputes between political subdivisions, including the deter-
mination of the location of a boundary defined by a shoreline. The su-
preme court therefore held Ingleside’s requested declaration was not “a
political question beyond the Court’s competence or authority.”19
In In re Crawford & Company, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the
scope of the Division of Workers’ Compensation’s exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising during the workers’ compensation claims and settle-
ment process.20 An employee, who was injured at work, and his wife filed
suit separately from the administrative proceedings against the em-
ployer’s workers’ compensation insurer and its claims handlers. The
plaintiffs asserted various tort, contract, and statutory causes of action.
The plaintiffs specifically pled the Workers’ Compensation Act did not
require them to pursue these independent and unrelated claims for dam-
ages through the Act’s administrative procedures. The supreme court dis-
agreed, holding all plaintiffs’ causes of action were related to the
investigation, processing, and settlement of the employee’s claim for
worker’s compensation benefits; thus, those claims were subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the division with the Act providing the exclusive
procedures and remedies for addressing those complaints.21 The supreme
court further addressed an issue left open in Ruttiger, and expressly held
that a claim for misrepresentation of an insurance policy during the
claims-settlement process under § 541.061 of the Insurance Code falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation division.22
Finally, the supreme court rejected the argument that the nonemployee
wife could bring claims independent of the act because all her claims
arose out of the investigation, handling, and settlement of the employee
worker’s claim for benefits and were thus barred.23 Accordingly, the su-
preme court conditionally granted mandamus, directing the trial court to
withdraw its order denying the plea to the jurisdiction and to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims.24
19. Id. at 592–93.
20. See generally In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2015).
21. Id. at 925–26 (discussing Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430 (Tex.
2012)) (noting the court of appeals read Ruttiger too narrowly, and emphasizing that courts
must focus on the substance of the claim being asserted to determine whether it falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the division rather than labels or the nature of relief sought).
22. Id. at 927–28.
23. Id. at 928 (citing Rodriguez v. Naylor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.
1989)). In Rodriguez, the Texas Supreme Court held that nonemployee spouse was barred
from bringing claims compensable under the act except for intentional torts. Rodriguez,
763 S.W.2d at 412.
24. In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d at 929.
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III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Texas courts in this Survey period continued to analyze the type and
quantum of evidence sufficient to establish a nonresident is subject to
specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. In Henkel v. Emjo Investments,
Ltd.,25 investors intervened in a suit against a defunct corporation, alleg-
ing fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud against former members of its
board of directors.26 One of the former board members, who was a citi-
zen of Austria and a resident of London, filed a special appearance, which
the trial court denied.27 On interlocutory appeal, the First Houston Court
of Appeals held the nonresident’s two meetings with a co-conspirator in
Texas demonstrated his purposeful availment of the forum, and not “sim-
ply a fortuitous connection to it.”28 The court of appeals found the two
meetings, coupled with the conspiracy allegations, provided a sufficient
nexus with Texas for suit to be brought there.29 The court of appeals re-
jected the nonresident’s argument that evidence of two meetings alone,
without proof of the meetings’ substance, was not enough to demonstrate
specific jurisdiction, explaining at the jurisdictional phase the relevant in-
quiry is the nonresident’s actual contacts with the forum state, not “what
the parties thought, said or intended.”30 The court of appeals also re-
jected the nonresident’s argument that the court’s analysis must be lim-
ited to the jurisdictional facts alleged in the petition, noting it considers
both the plaintiff’s original pleadings and response to the special appear-
ance in determining whether a plaintiff has met the burden to allege ade-
quate jurisdictional facts.31
In Waller Marine, Inc. v. Magie, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals held the allegations and evidence were insufficient to establish spe-
cific jurisdiction over two nonresident consultants for plaintiff’s claims of
fraud, unjust enrichment, and money had and received.32 The plaintiff
had enlisted a Texas contractor to complete a multi-million-dollar turbine
conversion project.33 The Texas contractor hired the two nonresident
consultants to assist it, and thereafter ran into problems completing the
project. The plaintiff later sued the Texas contractor, its officers, and the
nonresident consultants. The nonresidents filed special appearances,
which the trial court granted, and the plaintiff sought interlocutory re-
view. The court of appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that the nonresi-
dent consultants’ alleged partnership with the Texas contractor to
complete the project was dispositive of specific jurisdiction. Instead, the
25. 480 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id. at 6 (citing Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tex.
2013)).
29. Id. at 6–7.
30. Id. at 6 (citing and quoting Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 147).
31. Id. at 7.
32. Waller Marine, Inc. v. Magie, 463 S.W.3d 614, 619–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
33. Id. at 617–18.
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court of appeals focused on the type and quantity of the nonresidents’
contacts with Texas while working for the alleged partnership, and
whether those contacts were connected with the plaintiff’s claims.34 The
court of appeals noted that beyond vague allegations, the plaintiff had
not alleged that the nonresidents provided substandard services or that
any of their Texas contacts gave rise to the Texas contractor’s alleged
breach of contract.35 Likewise, the court of appeals found the nonresi-
dents’ contacts with the state had no connection to the factual basis of
either the unjust enrichment or the money had and received claims be-
cause plaintiff paid money to the Texas contractor, not the nonresidents.
Similarly, the court of appeals noted that all of plaintiff’s fraud allega-
tions preceded the nonresidents’ involvement in the project, showing
their later Texas contacts lacked any nexus with plaintiff’s fraud claims.
The court of appeals held the lack of connection between the nonresi-
dents’ contacts and the operative facts of the litigation made exercise of
specific jurisdiction inappropriate and affirmed the trial court’s order
granting the special appearances.36
Texas courts also addressed other procedural and substantive issues
arising in connection with special appearance motions during the Survey
period. In these decisions, the Texas courts affirmed a strict application of
the due-order requirements of Rule 120a of the Rules of Civil Procedure
and the freedom of parties to consent to personal jurisdiction by contract.
In Global Paragon Dallas, LLC v. SBM Realty, LLC, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived its special ap-
pearance and violated Rule 120a’s “due-order-of-hearing requirement”
by obtaining a ruling on its motion for new trial before obtaining a ruling
on its special appearance motion.37 In Stauffer v. Nicholson, the Dallas
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior holdings that a consent-to-jurisdic-
tion clause that encompasses claims against a nonresident defendant ob-
viates the need to rely solely on traditional analysis of minimum
contacts.38
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Texas Supreme Court held that evidence that a plaintiff had
knowledge of a defendant’s valid address, but effected service at and veri-
fied another last known address to obtain a no-answer default judgment
under Rule 239a of the Rules of Civil Procedure raised a fact issue, ren-
dering the judgment subject to challenge by bill of review.39 In Katy Ven-
34. Id. at 621.
35. Id. at 622.
36. Id. at 623.
37. Glob. Paragon Dall., LLC v. SBM Realty, LLC, 448 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
38. Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); see
also In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding), reh’g denied, No. 12-
0163, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 379 (Tex. May 2, 2014).
39. Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. 2015).
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ture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., a landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant
obtained a default judgment against the landlord and its general partner
claiming they were responsible for fire damage to its rented restaurant
space.40 The tenant had attempted to serve the landlord and general
agent at their registered address on file with the Secretary of State’s of-
fice but was unable to do so because the entities had moved to a new
address years earlier.41 Service was ultimately accomplished through the
Secretary of State, and the default judgment was entered when defend-
ants failed to answer. In its motion for default judgment, the tenant certi-
fied that defendants’ last known mailing address was their outdated
address.42 After learning of the default judgment, the landlord and its
general partner “filed a petition for an equitable bill of review, asserting
that [the tenant] had not properly served them with process and had not
properly certified their last known mailing address for notice of default
judgment under Rule 239a” because tenant had actual knowledge of their
current mailing address.43 The trial and appellate courts rejected the
landlord defendants’ arguments, respectively granting and affirming
traditional summary judgment in favor of tenant. The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that the landlord defendants presented “some
evidence that their failure to receive notice of the default judgment was
not the result of their fault or negligence,” and that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the tenant gave the trial court clerk
defendants’ “last known mailing address” as required by Rule 239a.44 The
supreme court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court.45
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the Katy Venture analysis in
Nussbaum v. Builders Bank.46 In the case, the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment against a loan guarantor.47 The loan guarantor timely filed a
bill of review challenging the default judgment, claiming he had changed
addresses from the one included in the guaranty agreement where service
was effected, had not received service of process, and that plaintiff had
put the old address on the certificate of last known address even though
plaintiff had knowledge of the new address (evidenced by the fact plain-
tiff sent a copy of the entered default judgment to the new address).48
The court of appeals initially affirmed the default judgment but granted
rehearing following the Texas Supreme Court’s Katy Venture decision.49
On rehearing, the court of appeals held that the defendant’s evidence
raised “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [plaintiff] gave the




44. Id. at 164.
45. Id. at 165.
46. 478 S.W.3d 104, 109–10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied).
47. Id. at 105–06.
48. Id. at 107–09.
49. Id. at 105.
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trial court [guarantor’s] last known mailing address as Rule 239a re-
quires,” reversing the default judgment, and remanding to the trial
court.50
V. VENUE
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court continued to grap-
ple with the Texas-resident-plaintiff exception to the forum noncon-
veniens statute.51 In In re Ford Motor Company, the Texas Supreme
Court interpreted the exception, noting, “The formula is simple: plaintiff
+ legal residence = right to a Texas forum.”52 The case arose from a fatal
single-car accident from a tire blowout in Mexico that injured the driver
and killed the driver’s brother. The driver sued his brother’s estate, which
joined Ford as a third-party defendant. Neither of them was a legal resi-
dent of Texas. Two statutory wrongful death beneficiaries who were Texas
residents intervened and asserted claims against Ford. Ford argued that
because the intervenors were not original plaintiffs, their residency
should be disregarded for purposes of Ford’s motion to dismiss for forum
nonconveniens. In a 6-3 ruling, the supreme court held that the exclusion
of “counterclaimaint, cross-claimant, or third-party plaintiff” from the
definition of “Plaintiff” in § 71.051(h)(2) of the Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code meant “only defendants who file third-party claims, cross-
claims, or counterclaims.”53 As such, the supreme court framed the ques-
tion presented as whether the intervenors who asserted claims against
Ford were more properly characterized as plaintiffs or defendants assert-
ing third-party claims.54
Five justices concluded that the intervenors were more like plaintiffs,
reasoning that when an intervenor seeks affirmative relief and is not be-
ing sued by another party, “we should operate under a presumption that
the intervenor is a plaintiff.”55 The supreme court also rejected Ford’s
argument that as wrongful death beneficiaries, the intervenors’ claims
were merely derivative of the estate meaning that the decedent’s foreign
resident statutes should be imputed to them. The supreme court reasoned
that wrongful death claims seek to recover distinct damages from survival
claims asserted by an estate. The majority therefore determined that the
intervenors were “distinct plaintiffs” whose Texas residency satisfied the
exception, keeping the entire case in Texas.56
50. Id. at 109–11.
51. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e) (West 2015) (generally pro-
viding a court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff’s claim if the “plaintiff is a legal resident of
this state”).
52. In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding).
53. Id. at 271–72 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 271–74.
55. Id. at 275. In his dissent, Justice Boyd makes a good case that the intervenors’
claims were aligned most perfectly with the defendant, who was likewise asserting third-
party claims against Ford. Id. at 295 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 284.
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Less than a year later, in In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations
LLC, the Texas Supreme Court heard another case involving a family’s
single-car accident in Mexico and the forum nonconveniens statute’s
Texas-resident-plaintiff exception.57 In the accident, the parents died, but
their two minor children survived. None of them were legal Texas re-
sidents. The minors sued in Texas through their uncle, who was a Texas
resident, as next friend. After deciding that the minors could sue through
their uncle as the minors’ next friend,58 the supreme court analyzed
whether a next friend legally residing in Texas should be considered a
“Plaintiff” for purposes of the forum nonconveniens statute when the mi-
nors are not.59 The supreme court concluded a Texas resident serving as a
next friend for a non-Texas minor is not a plaintiff for purposes of the
Texas-resident-plaintiff exception, and thus the exception did not pre-
clude dismissal for forum non nonconveniens.60
An amendment to the forum nonconveniens statute, effective June 16,
2015, narrowed the scope of the Texas-resident-plaintiff exception.61 The
bill’s sponsor asserted the changes were necessary because Texas courts
were applying the statute too broadly, enabling “resident intervenors or
derivative plaintiffs to bring a case from nonresidents into the state.”62
Unlike the prior version of the statute, the residency of a single Texas
plaintiff cannot anchor an entire multiparty case in Texas; instead, the
statute now provides for consideration of each plaintiff’s claims sepa-
rately, allowing dismissal or stay of nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.63 Nor
can a legal Texas resident who is a wrongful death beneficiary, personal
representative, or next friend keep a case in Texas if the real party in
interest is not—or if a decedent was not—a legal Texas resident.64 While
57. See generally In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding).
58. Id. at 570–71. The defendant argued Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure per-
mits suits through a next friend only when the minor has “no legal guardian,” and that the
minors’ grandparents, who resided in Mexico, automatically became the minors’ legal
guardians under Mexican law. Id. at 570. The supreme court determined that the purpose
of Rule 44 is “to enable minors to prosecute their claims . . . when they otherwise could not
through a legal guardian.” Id. Given the grandparents’ status as guardians in Mexico did
not give them authority to act for the minors in Texas, the supreme court held Rule 44
permitted the minors to sue through a next friend. Id. at 570–72.
59. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e) (West 2015) (generally pro-
viding a court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff’s claim if the “plaintiff is a legal resident of
this state”).
60. In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d at 573–75.
61. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051.
62. Bill Analysis of Tex. H.B. 1692, 84th Leg., R.S. (May 14, 2015) (statement of Rep-
resentative Sheets).
63. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e) (Texas-resident-plaintiff excep-
tion now provides the “determination of whether a claim may be stayed or dismissed . . .
shall be made with respect to each plaintiff without regard to whether the claim of any
other plaintiff may be stayed or dismissed . . . . If an action involves both plaintiffs who are
legal residents of this state and plaintiffs who are not, the court shall consider the factors
provided by Subsection (b) and determine whether to deny the motion or to stay or dismiss
the claim of any plaintiff who is not a legal resident of this state”).
64. The Legislature expressly narrowed the definition of “Plaintiff” to exclude a “rep-
resentative, administrator, guardian, or next friend,” unless that person is “otherwise a
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these changes appear to be aimed at narrowing the scope of In re Ford
Motor Company, they do not affect the supreme court’s holding that the
exclusion of “counterclaimant, cross-claimant, or third-party plaintiff”
from the definition of plaintiff for purposes of the Texas-resident-plaintiff
exception “excludes only defendants who file third-party claims, cross-
claims, or counterclaims.”65 The scope of the Texas-resident-plaintiff ex-
ception to the forum nonconveniens statute will likely continue to be an
issue litigated in Texas courts in future survey periods.
The mandatory venue statute for “major transactions” over $1 million
was at issue in In re Fisher.66 In the underlying case, the plaintiff received
partnership interests and a $6.5 million promissory note in exchange for
selling his oil services company to the defendants. Several distinct but
related agreements made up the entire transaction, and each agreement
had its own venue provision. When the oil services company filed for
bankruptcy, plaintiff sued defendants for financial mismanagement. The
defendants moved to transfer or dismiss under § 15.020 of the Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code.67 On mandamus review of the trial court’s order
denying the motion, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s claims
arose in connection with the overall transaction, which included agree-
ments with venue provisions. In response, plaintiff argued that his claims
did not arise from the agreements effecting the sale but instead from the
parties’ partnership agreement, which did not have a venue provision.
The Texas Supreme Court noted it had not yet addressed when an action
“arises from” a major transaction under § 15.020, but had addressed simi-
lar questions with regard to forum selection clauses.68 Relying on the
same analysis used to determine the scope of forum selection provisions,
the supreme court conducted a “common-sense examination of the sub-
stance of the [plaintiff’s] claims to determine whether the [mandatory
venue] statute applie[d].”69 In doing so, the supreme court concluded
plaintiff’s claims arose out of the sales transaction insofar as he was seek-
ing to recover the balance due under the uncollectible promissory note as
derivative claimant of a legal resident of this state.” Id. § 71.051(h)(2)(B). A “derivative
claimant” is “a person whose damages were caused by personal injury to or the wrongful
death of another.” Id. § 71.051(h)(1).
65. In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (empha-
sis in original).
66. 433 S.W.3d 523, 529 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020).
67. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020 (generally requiring action for “ma-
jor transaction” to be brought where parties agreed, providing suit may only be brought in
county “party against whom the action is brought has agreed in writing that a suit arising
from the transaction may be brought” and “may not be brought in a county if . . . the party
bringing the action has agreed in writing that an action arising from the transaction may
not be brought in that county . . . or . . . agreed in writing that an action arising from the
transaction must be brought in another county of this state or in another jurisdiction, and
the action may be brought in that other county”).
68. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d at 529.
69. Id. at 529–31 (discussing In re Int’l Profit Assocs., 274 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. 2009) (fo-
rum selection case); In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2010) (same)).
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damages.70 The supreme court examined the venue provision in the
promissory note, determined the provision was mandatory rather than
permissive, and then held the mandatory venue provision in § 15.020 re-
quired suit to be brought in the venue agreed upon in the promissory
note.71 Thus, the supreme court conditionally granted mandamus relief
directing the trial court to vacate its order denying and to grant the de-
fendants’ motion to transfer venue.72
VI. PARTIES
Several cases during the Survey period dealt with the distinction be-
tween standing and capacity. In Highland Credit Opportunities CDO,
L.P. v. UBS AG, a hedge fund manager sued an investment bank for
breach of contract in connection with trades it made with the bank in
distressed loans.73 One of the hedge fund entities was a party to the origi-
nal contract with the bank, but a different, related hedge fund entity,
which was the named plaintiff, was listed as the entity on the final, revised
trade confirmation order.74 The bank argued that there was no evidence
of an assignment from the hedge fund entity on the original contract to
the named plaintiff, framing the issue as a lack of privity and standing.75
After a bench trial, the trial court found plaintiff failed to prove the bank
breached the contract and entered a take-nothing judgment against it.76
On plaintiff’s appeal of the take-nothing judgment, the bank again as-
serted the plaintiff hedge fund entity lacked standing because there was
no competent evidence of an assignment of the original contract. The
Dallas Court of Appeals explained the distinctions between the fre-
quently confused concepts of standing and capacity, and held the bank’s
complaint regarding whether plaintiff was “entitled to sue on the contract
[was] a question of capacity,” not standing.77 The court of appeals empha-
sized that, unlike standing, lack of capacity was procedural and could be
waived if not challenged by verified denial under Rule 93 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.78 The court of appeals then noted while the bank had
not challenged plaintiff’s capacity by affidavit under Rule 93, the parties
had clearly tried the issue by consent thereby preserving the issue for
review on appeal.79 In its review, the court of appeals ultimately deter-
70. Id. at 531.
71. Id. at 531–34.
72. Id. at 535.
73. Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. v. UBS AG, 451 S.W.3d 508, 514–15
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).
74. Id. at 518.
75. Id. at 515–16.
76. Id. at 515.
77. Id. at 515–16. The court of appeals noted that it had “previously held numerous
times, that a challenge to a party’s privity of contract is a challenge to capacity, not stand-
ing.” Id. at 516 (quoting Transcon. Realty Inv’rs, Inc. v. Wicks, 442 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied)).
78. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 93).
79. Id. at 517 (noting five days prior to the bench trial the parties signed a Rule 11
agreement acknowledging the “proper party” issue remained for trial).
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mined plaintiff had capacity to sue under the contract despite the lack of
a written assignment.80
The Dallas Court of Appeals also addressed the distinctions between
standing and capacity in Fitness Evolution, L.P. v. Headhunter Fitness,
L.L.C., which involved a “complicated web of claims” relating to a lease
of shopping center space.81 In the trial court, one of the defendants chal-
lenged another party’s status to pursue claims as a putative assignee by
summary judgment, framing it as standing issue. The court of appeals first
addressed the standing challenges to confirm its subject matter jurisdic-
tion, then explained the differences between capacity and standing, and
finally reaffirmed that a challenge to a party’s privity of contract by as-
signment or otherwise is a capacity issue, not a challenge to jurisdictional
standing.82 The court of appeals declined to review the capacity issue on
appeal because no verified denial under Rule 93 had been filed to pre-
serve it, and the record did not show capacity was adjudicated or tried by
consent since all the briefing and argument in the trial court related to
standing.83
At issue in Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc. v. Wicks was whether
a retroactive assignment of rights under a lease effectively cured a defect
in the plaintiff trust’s capacity.84 The lease was between landlord and ten-
ant, but landlord’s trust with no rights under the lease was the named
plaintiff at the time summary judgment on tenant’s liability for breach of
the lease was obtained. Before the trial on damages, landlord assigned
the lease to the trust with a retroactive effective date. The trial court then
entered a money judgment in favor of the trust. On appeal, the tenant
challenged the trust’s “standing.”85 The Dallas Court of Appeals once
again explained that privity of contract challenges raise capacity rather
than standing issues. The court of appeals held the retroactive assignment
was effective under the terms of the lease and cured any capacity defects
because the trust received no more under the assignment than it had al-
leged it had the right to enforce all along.86 The trial court’s judgment
was therefore affirmed.87
80. Id. at 517–18.
81. Fitness Evolution, L.P. v. Headhunter Fitness, L.L.C., No. 05-13-00506-CV, 2015
WL 6750047, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
82. Id. at *12–19.
83. Id. at *19–21 (noting the record did not show trial by consent because the only
expressly stated ground for summary judgment was standing; the only case law cited in the
brief related to standing; and the trial court’s order granting the motion did not refer to
either standing or capacity).
84. Transcon. Realty Inv’rs, Inc. v. Wicks, 442 S.W.3d 676, 678–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, pet. denied).
85. Id. at 679.
86. Id. at 679–80.
87. Id. at 682.
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VII. PLEADINGS
In Zorilla v. Aypco Construction II, LLC, the Texas Supreme Court
resolved a conflict among the courts of appeal over whether the exem-
plary damages cap88 must be pled under Rule 94 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure’s residual clause as “any other matter constituting an avoid-
ance or affirmative defense.”89 In the underlying residential construction
dispute, the trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of
the statutory cap when defendant failed to plead the cap as an affirmative
defense; instead, the defendant raised the cap for the first time in her
motion for new trial.90 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ex-
emplary damages award, holding that the cap did not apply because it
had not been pled as an affirmative defense.91 The Texas Supreme Court
analyzed whether the exemplary damages cap constituted an avoidance
or an affirmative defense within the meaning of Rule 94, and concluded it
was neither.92 The supreme court reasoned that, unlike the “hallmark
characteristic” of affirmative defenses or avoidances, which impose the
burden of proof on a defendant, the exemplary damages cap “does not
require proof of any additional fact to establish its applicability; moreo-
ver, there is no defense to it.”93 The supreme court therefore held the
exemplary damages cap was not subject to Rule 94’s affirmative pleading
requirement and was timely raised by motion for new trial.94 It reversed
and rendered the exemplary damages award subject to the statutory cap
in the judgment.95
In In re Memorial Herman Hospital System, the Texas Supreme Court
also addressed whether a doctor’s pleading sufficiently alleged claims
under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 (TFEAA).96
Relying heavily on federal antitrust case law, the supreme court held that
a cardiovascular surgeon’s allegations that a hospital’s statements ad-
versely affected his reputation among cardiologists, his primary source of
referrals, was sufficient to support the doctor’s antitrust claim. The doctor
claimed these statements cast doubt on the viability of robotic heart sur-
geries in Houston, resulting in increased costs for consumers’ longer hos-
pital stays. The supreme court found these allegations to be enough to
plead “injury to competition” generally, rather than to a single competi-
tor, under the TFEAA.97 The supreme court further found the doctor’s
88. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (West 2015).
89. Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015). The supreme
court also noted that the Fort Worth, Corpus Christi, and First Houston courts of appeals
held the statutory cap must be pled as an affirmative defense while the San Antonio, Four-
teenth Houston, and Amarillo courts of appeals had held it was not. Id. at 151 n.6.
90. Id. at 151.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 155–57.
93. Id. at 156–57.
94. Id. at 158.
95. Id.
96. In re Mem’l Herman Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 709–13 (Tex. 2015).
97. Id. at 708–12.
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allegations were sufficient to support several viable relevant markets for
the doctor’s claims under the TFEAA, and the number of potential alter-
native service and geographical markets alleged did not qualify as plead-
ing defects.98 The supreme court therefore concluded that the doctor had
sufficiently pled “multiple viable anticompetitive actions” under the
TFEAA.99
Several cases in the Survey period addressed timeliness of pleading
amendments under Rule 63 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In Holmes v.
GMAC, Inc., the defaulting purchaser of a vehicle sought to amend his
counterclaim to add purported class claims on behalf of Texas residents
with GMAC “Smart Buy” contracts eight days after the scheduling order
pleading amendment deadline.100 The trial court struck the amendment
on GMAC’s motion, and the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the proposed amendment was both untimely despite continuation of
the initial trial setting and prejudicial on its face because the class action
claims drastically altered the straightforward nature of the case.101 The
three weeks of discovery remaining at the time of the proposed amend-
ment was inadequate to allow GMAC to defend those claims, and there
was no evidence GMAC could have anticipated the class action
amendment.102
By contrast, in Crosstex North Texas Pipeline v. Gardiner, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals found the trial court abused its discretion by not
allowing an amendment adding an “abnormal and out-of-place” culpabil-
ity theory to plaintiffs’ nuisance claim requested during the charge con-
ference, only four days after trial began.103 In denying leave to amend,
the trial court determined plaintiffs’ pleadings did not put defendant on
notice of the “abnormal and out-of-place” nuisance theory even though it
had no doubt the evidence would support submission of that theory to
the jury.104 The court of appeals reviewed the record, finding plaintiffs’
entire case was grounded on complaints that the noise generated by the
defendant’s compressor station was “abnormal and out-of-place” in the
rural surroundings of their homes.105 The court of appeals further found
the defendant had offered no evidence of prejudice or surprise; nor could
it reasonably do so given the requested amendment merely conformed
the pleadings to the evidence.106 The court of appeals therefore reversed
the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial to allow
plaintiffs to add the additional “abnormal and out-of-place” nuisance
98. Id. at 712–13.
99. Id. at 713.
100. Holmes v. GMAC, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 85, 94 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
101. Id. at 95.
102. Id. at 94–95.
103. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline v. Gardiner, 451 S.W.3d 150, 178–79 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2014), aff’d by No. 15-0049, 2016 WL 3483165 (Tex. June 24, 2016).
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 178–79.
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theory.107
Whether a general plea for attorneys’ fees in a prayer was sufficient to
authorize recovery was at issue in Compass Bank v. Nacim.108 In this
case, the defendant bank sought recovery of its attorneys’ fees as the pre-
vailing party in a suit based on a 2007 customer account contract after
establishing its customers’ claims for 2007 losses were barred by limita-
tions.109 The trial court denied the bank’s request, finding it had neither
pled nor proved its entitlement to recovery of fees.110 On appeal, the
bank argued its prayers in amended pleadings for “exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, post-judgment interest, and all courts [sic] of court” were
sufficient to allow recovery of its attorneys’ fees.111 While noting a gen-
eral request in a prayer authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees if the
pleading as a whole provides fair notice of the legal basis of or facts sup-
porting the claim, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the bank’s bare
requests in prayers of two amended pleadings were insufficient because
the 2007 transactions were not at issue at the time of the first pleading.112
Further, neither pleading alleged facts about the 2007 transactions or the
2007 account contract attorneys’ fee provision.113 In absence of these al-
legations, the court of appeals held the bank’s general prayers did not
provide fair notice that the bank would seek its attorneys’ fees for de-
fending against customers’ claimed 2007 losses based on the account con-
tract.114 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
bank’s request.115
VIII. DISCOVERY
In In re Memorial Hermann Hospital System, the Texas Supreme Court
analyzed the applicability of the medical committee and the medical peer
review committee privileges.116 In this case, the real party in interest was
a cardiothoracic surgeon who sued, among others, the hospital at which
he had formerly practiced. He alleged claims for “business disparage-
ment, defamation, tortious interference with prospective business rela-
tions, and improper restraint of trade under the [TFEAA]” arising out of
the “whisper campaign” that followed his decision to move his practice to
another hospital.117 When the surgeon filed a motion to compel, the hos-
107. Id. at 179.
108. 459 S.W.3d 95, 111–14 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
109. Id. at 111–12.
110. Id. at 112.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 112–13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 113–14. The court of appeals also rejected the bank’s argument that its enti-
tlement to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the 2007 contract was tried by
consent. Id.
116. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 695 (Tex. 2015) (orig.
proceeding).
117. Id. at 695–97.
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pital invoked the medical committee and medical peer review committee
privileges,118 and the trial court ordered the production of certain docu-
ments.119 On mandamus review, the supreme court found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the “anticompetitive ac-
tion” exception to the medical peer review committee privilege120 ap-
plied, because the plaintiff had asserted one or more claims requiring
proof of conduct having “‘a tendency to reduce or eliminate competition’
that [was] not offset by countervailing procompetitive justifications.”121
After analyzing whether the specific documents at issue were relevant,
the supreme court then inquired as to whether the documents were ex-
empt from disclosure by the medical committee privilege in § 161.032 of
the Health and Safety Code.122 Because the documents were subject to
both sections, the specific exception in § 160.007(b) of the Occupations
Code applied and required the production of the documents.123
The propriety of post-judgment discovery was at issue in In re Long-
view Energy Company.124 Following a substantial judgment on the plain-
tiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, the trial court ordered, in accordance
with Rule 24.1(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,125 that one defen-
dant had to produce, on a monthly basis, “essentially all documents per-
taining to the operation of the Eagle Ford shale assets” the defendants
had wrongfully obtained.126 The court of appeals rejected the defendants’
argument that the discovery order was an abuse of discretion.127 The de-
fendants then sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court,
contending that Rule 24.1(e) had to be read in light of Rule 621a of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows discovery only “for the purpose of
obtaining information to aid in the enforcement” of a judgment that has
not been superseded and “for the purpose of obtaining information rele-
vant to” Rule 24 motions.128 The supreme court disagreed, finding that
“nothing in Rule 621a purports to limit Rule 24.1(e).”129 The supreme
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the
118. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032 (West 2015) (defining the medical
committee privilege); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007 (West 2015) (defining the medical
peer review committee privilege).
119. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d at 697.
120. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(b) (“If a judge makes a preliminary finding
that a proceeding or record of a medical peer review committee or a communication made
to the committee is relevant to an anticompetitive action, or to a civil rights proceeding
brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the proceeding, record, or communication is not
confidential to the extent it is considered relevant.”).
121. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d at 706, 708–13.
122. Id. at 716–17 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.032).
123. Id. at 718–19.
124. 464 S.W.3d 353, 361–62 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
125. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(e) (“The trial court may make any order necessary to ade-
quately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might
cause.”).
126. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d at 356.
127. Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Longview Energy Co., No. 04-12-00630-CV, 2014 WL
661710, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 12, 2014, pet. denied).
128. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d at 362 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 621a).
129. Id.
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plaintiff, in lieu of a bond superseding the constructive trust portion of its
judgment, “access to information . . . to protect itself from any dissipation
of assets” by the defendants during the pendency of the appeal.130
In In re Doe, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the interplay be-
tween pre-suit depositions under Rule 202 of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and personal jurisdiction.131 “Rule 202 . . . allows ‘a proper court’ to
authorize a [pre-suit] deposition to investigate . . . claims.”132 The issue
was whether that a proper court must have personal jurisdiction over the
would-be deponent.133 The real party in interest had been the subject of
some less-than-flattering internet postings, and he filed a Rule 202 peti-
tion in Harris County to depose Google—the host of the blog at issue—
to ascertain the identity of the blog’s owner, against whom suit was antici-
pated.134 The blog owner filed a special appearance, claiming that his sole
contact with Texas was that his blog could be read there, and contending
there was no proper court that could order a Rule 202 deposition of
him.135 In a 5–4 decision, the supreme court agreed, holding that it was
implicit in Rule 202 and its predecessors that a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the anticipated action and personal jurisdiction over the
potential deponent defendant.136 If the supreme court held otherwise, a
potential defendant would have less protection under Rule 202 than he
would have if a lawsuit had actually been filed, which he could challenge
through a special appearance under Rule 120a. Thus, Rule 202 “could be
used by anyone in the world to investigate a claim against anyone else in
the world against whom suit could be brought within the trial court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.”137
The impact of parties’ failure to comply with Rule 47 on their previ-
ously served discovery requests was the subject of In re Greater McAllen
Star Properties, Inc.138 Rule 47, which was amended effective March 1,
2013, requires a party to provide some measure of specificity regarding
the amount of monetary relief the party seeks and prohibits the party
from conducting any discovery until it files an amended pleading comply-
ing with Rule 47’s requirements.139 The plaintiff filed a motion to compel
regarding the discovery responses of the defendant, who contended that
the underlying requests were invalid because the plaintiff’s pleading did
not comply with Rule 47 at the time she served them. The trial court
granted the motion to compel, and the defendant sought mandamus re-
130. Id.
131. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 604 (Tex. 2014).
132. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.2(b).
133. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d at 604.
134. Id. at 604–05.
135. Id. at 605.
136. Id. at 608–10.
137. Id. at 610. Justice Lehrmann dissented, concluding that the majority’s analysis ef-
fectively abolished defamation claims against persons who claimed anonymity, particularly
online. Id. at 611 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
138. 444 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, orig. proceeding).
139. Id. at 750–51 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 47).
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lief, arguing that the plaintiff had to re-propound her discovery requests
after she amended her petition to comply with Rule 47.140 The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that, in light of
the liberal construction afforded to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
plaintiff did not have to re-propound her discovery requests; instead, the
time to respond to the requests began to run on the date she filed an
amended petition complying with Rule 47.141
Efforts to withdraw deemed admissions were the subject of multiple
opinions during the Survey period. In Soto v. General Foam & Plastics
Corp., the defendant, who was at the time represented by counsel, did not
respond to the plaintiff’s requests for admissions.142 At a subsequent
hearing, the trial court allowed the defendant’s counsel to withdraw and
deemed admitted the plaintiff’s requests.143 The defendant, proceeding
pro se, did not file a response to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
ment, which was based in large part upon the deemed admissions. After
the trial court entered summary judgment, the defendant retained his
original counsel, who alleged that the defendant was entitled to a new
trial under the equitable standard challenging a no-answer default judg-
ment.144 The trial court declined to hold a hearing on the motion for new
trial, which “was overruled by operation of law,” and the defendant ap-
pealed.145 The El Paso Court of Appeals found that Craddock did not
apply, as the defendant had notice of the hearing and the opportunity to
either seek a continuance or file a late response to the plaintiff’s mo-
tion.146 The court of appeals then held that good cause did not exist for
the withdrawal of the deemed admissions, because the defendant had
been represented by counsel during the time discovery was ongoing, his
counsel had sought to withdraw based on the defendant’s refusal to coop-
erate during discovery, and the trial court had deemed the requests ad-
mitted as a sanction for the defendant’s discovery abuse.147
On the other hand, in In re Sewell, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
held that the trial court erred in denying the relator’s motion to withdraw
his deemed admissions.148 The relator received the requests for admis-
sions during the time he was not represented by counsel, but when his
subsequently retained counsel requested copies of the previously served
documents, the real party in interest did not tender copies of the requests
140. Id. at 750–51.
141. Id. at 751 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 1). The court of appeals also held that the defen-
dant was not entitled to mandamus relief regarding the trial court’s decision to compel the
defendant to respond to discovery while refusing to hear its motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 748–50.
142. Soto v. Gen. Foam & Plastics Corp., 458 S.W.3d 78, 80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014,
no pet.).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 80–81 (citing Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 125–26
(Tex. 1939)).
145. Id. at 81.
146. See id. at 82 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)).
147. Id. at 84–85.
148. In re Sewell, 472 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, orig. proceeding).
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for admissions.149 The morning of the trial, the real party in interest filed
a certificate of deemed admissions; after the trial court granted a continu-
ance, the relator filed a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions.150
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and when the relator
sought mandamus relief, the real party in interest withdrew eight of the
requests for admissions, which it acknowledged were merit-preclusive.151
The trial court affirmed its denial of the motion with respect to the other
eight requests on the ground that the relator had acted with conscious
indifference.152 The court of appeals, however, found that the trial court
applied the wrong standard to two of the requests for admissions that
were merit-preclusive, because allowing such requests to be deemed ad-
mitted was essentially “a case-ending discovery sanction.”153 Rather, the
standard for the withdrawal of deemed admissions that are merit-preclu-
sive is whether the responding party’s failure to answer resulted from bla-
tant bad faith or shameless disregard for the rules.154 Because the real
party in interest admitted that two of the remaining eight requests were
merit-preclusive and the record did not affirmatively show that the other
six requests were not merit-preclusive, the court of appeals found that the
relator was entitled to withdraw the deemed admission of all eight
requests.155
The trial court’s order compelling the defendant landlord to turn over
its computer hard drive to a third-party forensic examiner was at issue in
In re VERP Investment, LLC.156 The landlord had changed the locks due
to the plaintiff tenant’s failure to pay rent for ten months. In the tenant’s
action for wrongful lockout and breach of contract, he alleged he had
received neither invoices for many of the months in dispute nor account-
ings of various offsets he claimed were applicable. In his discovery re-
quests, the tenant sought electronic information and data concerning the
invoices, to which the landlord objected on grounds of burdensomeness
and that the information could be obtained “through more appropriate
means.”157 The trial court ordered the landlord to permit a mutually satis-
factory forensic examiner to make a mirror image of the accounting
software and the supporting data relating to the invoices at issue.158 The
landlord sought mandamus relief, contending that the trial court’s ruling
149. Id. at 453–54.
150. Id. at 454.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 455–56.
154. Id. at 456 (citing Time Warner, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 441 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2014, pet. denied)).
155. Id. at 461–62; see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Noble Energy, Inc., 462 S.W.3d 255,
265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed) (holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the defendant to withdraw its admissions to requests that
stemmed from the scope of the contractual obligations in dispute and there was insufficient
evidence that the plaintiff would suffer delay or prejudice as a result of the withdrawal).
156. 457 S.W.3d 255, 258 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 258–59.
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failed to comply with either Rule 196.4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
which addresses e-discovery, or the key case that analyzed those discov-
ery procedures.159 The Dallas Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief,
finding that the landlord’s objections sufficiently preserved its rights to
challenge the trial court’s order and that the tenant had failed to make
the threshold showing that the landlord was in default of its obligation to
search its records and produce the requested data.160
IX. DISMISSAL
In In re Conner, the Texas Supreme Court held that mandamus relief
was available due to the trial court’s failure to dismiss for want of prose-
cution.161 The supreme court held a plaintiff’s unreasonably long delay
without sufficient explanation “will raise a conclusive presumption of
abandonment” justifying dismissal under the court’s inherent authority
and Rule 165a of the Rules of Civil Procedure.162 As far as quantifying
unreasonable delay, the supreme court noted the plaintiffs’ ten-year de-
lay in that case far exceeded the eighteen months allowed for disposing of
most civil cases under the Rules of Judicial Administration.163 The case
was filed in 2004, and plaintiffs cited their counsel’s heath issues in re-
sponse to defendants’ 2011 motion to dismiss. Two years later in 2013,
defendants moved to dismiss for the continued lack of activity, and plain-
tiffs again cited their counsel’s health as an excuse (despite defendants’
introduction of court records showing plaintiffs’ counsel appeared in
many matters in the intervening two years). The trial court nonetheless
denied the 2013 motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals denied de-
fendants’ requested mandamus relief.164 The supreme court held plain-
tiffs’ inability to show good cause for the almost ten-year delay mandated
dismissal under Rule 165a(1), and mandamus relief was appropriate both
because the trial court’s refusal to dismiss could not be effectively chal-
lenged on appeal and “[t]o deny relief by mandamus permits the very
delay dismissal is intended to prevent.”165 The supreme court therefore
conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate
its order denying the 2013 motion to dismiss and to dismiss the case for
want of prosecution.166
159. Id. at 260–61; see In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 313–15 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding).
160. In re VERP Inv., 457 S.W.3d at 261–62. The court of appeals also noted that, even
if the tenant had made this showing, mandamus relief would nonetheless have been appro-
priate because he had failed to show that retrieval of the information he sought was feasi-
ble. See id. at 263.
161. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
162. Id. at 534. The supreme court also noted that a court may dismiss for want of
prosecution if a plaintiff fails to “prosecut[e] the suit to a conclusion with reasonable dili-
gence.” Id. (quoting Callahan v. Staples, 161 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1942)).
163. Id. (quoting TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.1(b)(1)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 535.
166. Id.
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In Molina v. Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed whether the
election of remedies provision of the Tort Claims Act required dismissal
of a city employee where the plaintiff’s original petition named the
city.167 The supreme court held a plaintiff must choose at the outset
whether to sue a governmental employee individually for acts outside the
scope of his employment and conduct discovery within that scope or to
seek redress from the city and forego any claims against the employee
individually.168 If the plaintiff joins the city, the supreme court held an
employee is entitled to dismissal of the individual claims against him
under § 101.106(f) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.169 Although
the supreme court acknowledged plaintiffs are sometimes faced with a
difficult choice at the outset, it held that under § 101.106(a), plaintiff’s
choice to sue the city barred all claims against city employees (rather than
just claims brought against employees in their official capacity as found
by the court of appeals).170 The supreme court therefore reversed the
court of appeals’ judgment, and rendered judgment for the employee.171
In Tic N. Central Dallas 3, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc. and CTL/
Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Association, Inc., the
Dallas and Fort Worth Courts of Appeals, respectively, examined the
statute that requires a certificate of merit for “damages arising out of the
provision of professional services” of an architect firm.172 Under the stat-
ute, a trial court must dismiss an action if the plaintiff fails to file a certifi-
cate with its complaint, which the courts have uniformly held means the
first-filed petition.173 The “dismissal may be with prejudice.”174 Despite
some procedural differences, after each case was dismissed without
prejudice because the plaintiffs failed to comply with § 150.002(e), the
defendants in both cases moved to dismiss subsequent petitions, arguing
that “no certificate of merit may be attached to a dismissed-without-
prejudice-then-subsequently-refiled-claim.”175 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals concluded, and the Forth Worth Court of Appeals later agreed, that
167. Molina v. Alvarado, 463 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Tex. 2015) (discussing Tort Claims Act
election of remedies provision § 101.106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
168. See id. at 871 (concluding that if a plaintiff at the outset possesses insufficient in-
formation to determine whether employee was acting within the course and scope, the
“prudent choice” would be to sue the employee, conduct scope discovery to resolve that
question, and later substitute the city as permitted by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 101.106(f)).
169. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f) (West 2015); Molina, 463
S.W.3d at 871.
170. Molina, 463 S.W.3d at 871.
171. Id. at 871–72.
172. Tic N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 71, 74 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2014, pet. denied); CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n,
Inc., 461 S.W.3d 627, 628 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied); see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(e) (requiring certificate of merit to be filed).
173. Tic N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C., 463 S.W.3d at 76 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 150.002(e)).
174. Id. at 75 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(e)).
175. CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC, 461 S.W.3d at 630; see Tic N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C., 463
S.W.3d at 76–77.
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“when a plaintiff files a new action and includes a certificate of merit with
the first-filed petition in that action, the plaintiff has complied with the
plain language of the statute” even if the court dismissed an earlier action
without prejudice for failure to include that document.176
Since its addition to the procedural landscape, dismissal practice under
Rule 91a of the Rules of Civil Procedure has generated a number of in-
consistent intermediate court opinions on various issues,177 but only one
from the Texas Supreme Court, In re Essex Insurance Company.178 In
that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for “personal injuries and then
added a declaratory judgment claim against [defendant’s] insurer” to de-
termine coverage.179 The insurer moved to dismiss under Rule 91a, argu-
ing that there was no basis in law for a direct action against it before its
insured’s liability to the plaintiff had been established.180 The trial court
denied the insurer’s Rule 91a motions to dismiss the claims against it, and
the court of appeals denied mandamus relief. However, given the insured
defendant’s liability had yet to be determined and in light of the “no di-
rect action” rule, the supreme court conditionally granted mandamus re-
lief “to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on
fatally flawed proceedings.”181
Gaskill, III, M.D. v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC arose from a
dispute over the interplay between Rule 91a’s provision requiring four-
teen days’ notice of hearing and its forty-five-day mandatory deadline for
deciding a motion to dismiss.182 As in the summary judgment context, the
hearing date for a Rule 91a motion determines the deadline for filing a
response.183 The defendant movant argued that the mandatory forty-five-
day deadline for deciding motions under the rule effectively gave the
plaintiff notice that the court would rule on the motion on the forty-fifth
day, even without plaintiff being served with formal notice of hearing.
After the trial court granted the Rule 91a motion, plaintiff filed a motion
for new trial complaining the motion had been heard and decided without
notice to him, effectively giving him no meaningful opportunity to re-
spond.184 The trial court denied the motion for new trial and plaintiff
appealed.185 The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded Rule 91a’s
176. Tic N. Cent. Dall. 3, L.L.C., 463 S.W.3d at 77; see CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC, 461
S.W.3d at 631.
177. For example, the courts of appeals are divided on whether Rule 91a leaves Texas’
liberal “fair notice” standard unaltered, or whether it is analogous enough to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) to permit applying federal authority requiring a claim for relief to be plausible
on its face. See, e.g., GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Beau-
mont 2014, pet. denied) (analogous to Rule 12(b)(6)); Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71,
76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (unaltered).
178. 450 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding).
179. Id. at 525.
180. Id. at 526.
181. Id. at 528.
182. Gaskill, III, M.D. v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC, 456 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (discussing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 238.
185. Id.
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notice provisions must be strictly construed, refused to imply notice of
hearing (which in turn would set a response date for the non-movant)
from the rule’s forty-five-day decision deadline, and held that formal no-
tice of hearing is required regardless of whether the court will hold an
oral hearing.186 Finding the trial court ruled on the motion without pro-
viding plaintiff with notice of hearing or meaningful opportunity to re-
spond, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court without reaching the merits of the dismissal ruling.187
X. JURY PRACTICE
In State v. Treeline Partners, Ltd., the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals addressed the limitations a trial court may place upon counsel
during voir dire.188 This action arose out of a condemnation proceeding in
which the court awarded the landowner almost $4.9 million. During voir
dire, the landowner’s counsel implied that the State improperly mini-
mized its payments to landowners, informed the potential jurors of the
parties’ failure to settle, and detailed the parties’ valuations. But when
the State’s lawyer announced her plans to ask potential jurors “whether
anybody believes that the State lowballs,” the trial judge prohibited her
from asking that question or anything similar and told her that, if she
tried to do so, she would probably be held in contempt.189 The court of
appeals found that these rulings were an abuse of discretion, as they im-
properly prevented the State from determining “whether the venire
members held a preexisting bias or prejudice that the State underesti-
mates property values” and thereby challenging such a member, whether
for cause or through a peremptory strike.190 The court of appeals then
found that the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful, as it was im-
possible to determine whether additional jurors would have been chal-
lenged or removed, especially where the trial judge prohibited
questioning about whether “the State lowballs” or “anything similar” and
threatened its attorney with contempt if she asked such questions.191
In DeWolf v. Kohler, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals con-
sidered the waiver of complaints about improper jury argument.192
Where improper jury argument is curable, the complaining party pre-
serves error “by obtaining an adverse ruling on a timely objection, mo-
186. Id. at 238–39.
187. Id. at 239.
188. State v. Treeline Partners, Ltd., 476 S.W.3d 572, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, pet. filed).
189. Id. at 575.
190. Id. at 577. The court of appeals also took issue with the trial judge’s refusal to
provide any clarification during the bench conference regarding what the State’s attorney
could and could not ask. Id. at 577–78.
191. Id. at 578–79.
192. DeWolf v. Kohler, 452 S.W.3d 373, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.).
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tion to instruct the jury, or motion for mistrial.”193 On the other hand, if
the probable harm is incurable, then the complaining party may preserve
the error with a motion for new trial and a timely objection is not re-
quired.194 The court of appeals found the plaintiff waived any complaint
to defendant counsel’s references to her assumption of the risk and im-
proper personal attacks on her counsel by failing to make a contempora-
neous objection or a timely motion for an instruction or a new trial.195
Also, in her motion for new trial, the plaintiff did not allege that such
statements constituted an incurable jury argument.196 Moreover, al-
though the plaintiff had raised a contemporaneous objection to a third
complaint, she neither secured a ruling on it from the trial court nor
raised the issue in her motion for new trial, resulting in a failure to pre-
serve that complaint as well.197
Finally, in Berwick v. Wagner, the First Houston Court of Appeals re-
viewed the standards associated with the disqualification of jurors for
cause.198 In this conservatorship dispute between two same-sex partners,
the petitioner contended that five venire members were improperly
stricken not because they were unable to pass judgment, but instead be-
cause of the nature of their religious beliefs about sexual behavior. On
the other hand, the respondent argued that the members were properly
stricken because they “admitted harboring personal biases and/or
prejudices that would [have] prevent[ed] [them from] deciding the case”
using the evidence and the law presented.199 A challenge for cause is ap-
propriate where a venire member’s feelings are so strong in favor of one
side on a given issue that either his “verdict will be based on those feel-
ings and not on the evidence,”200 or a member “cannot revive his or her
eligibility by recanting an earlier expression of bias or prejudice.”201 Ap-
plying these standards, the court of appeals found that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion because it did not strike each panel member who
disclosed possible religious objections to homosexuality.202 Rather, the
193. Id. at 396 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Penalver, 256
S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. 2008); Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex.
1954)).
194. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(5); Clark v. Bres, 217 S.W.3d 501, 509 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 396–97.
197. Id. at 397. The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiff’s challenges to the trial
court’s refusal to include two requested instructions in the charge and inclusion of one
question, finding that she had cited no evidence of some of the elements of the omitted
instructions, had provided only a partial reporter’s record that prevented the court of ap-
peals from finding harmful error, and complained of matters that were rendered irrelevant
by the jury’s findings on other issues. Id. at 394–96.
198. Berwick v. Wagner, No. 01-12-00872-CV, 2014 WL 4493470, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
199. Id.
200. Id. at *9 (citing Buls v. Fuselier, 55 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001,
no pet.)).
201. Id. (citing Smith v. Dean, 232 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet.
denied)).
202. Id.
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lower court struck only those members who unequivocally indicated that
they could not base their decisions on the law and evidence because of
their religious beliefs.203
XI. JURY CHARGE
In Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero, the Texas Supreme Court
overruled two of its prior decisions by holding that relevant evidence of a
party’s use or nonuse of seat belts is admissible for the purpose of appor-
tioning responsibility in a civil action.204 The supreme court then pro-
vided some guidance on how its holding might impact the admissibility of
seat-belt evidence and “how to construct a jury charge” when such evi-
dence (or other pre-occurrence, injury-causing conduct) is admitted.205
Under § 33.003(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the fact
finder may consider a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt negligent or in
violation of the law.206 The supreme court thus concluded that trial courts
could continue to use a single apportionment question, as a jury could
consider the “plaintiff’s pre-occurrence, injury-causing conduct” along-
side his and other persons’ occurrence-causing conduct.207
The deadline for trial courts to stop entertaining charge objections was
the subject of King Fisher Marine Service, L.P. v. Tamez.208 Under mari-
time law, a “specific order” is one that requires a seaman to complete a
specific task in a specific way.209 The defendant first requested the jury be
instructed on specific orders “the morning after the formal charge confer-
ence and minutes before the trial court [would] read the charge.”210 The
trial judge refused to consider the request on the ground that it was un-
timely, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the defendant had
“ample opportunity to present its proposed instruction.”211 In its appeal
to the Texas Supreme Court, the defendant contended that Rule 272 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure212 requires trial courts to “accept objections
to the charge up to the moment it is read to the jury” and does not give
trial courts discretion to shorten that deadline.213 The supreme court dis-
agreed, concluding that Rule 272 merely sets a broad deadline for charge
203. Id.
204. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 563 (Tex. 2015), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part by No. 08-09-00319-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2074 (Tex. Feb. 26, 2016)
(overruling Kerby v. Abilene Christian Coll., 503 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1973); Carnation Co. v.
Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974)).
205. Id. at 563–64.
206. Id. at 563.
207. Id. at 564.
208. 443 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. 2014).
209. Id. at 842.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez, No. 13-10-00425-CV, 2012 WL
1964567, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 31, 2012) (mem. op.), aff’d by 443 S.W.3d
838 (Tex. 2014)).
212. TEX. R. CIV. P. 272 (providing that objections must be presented in writing or
dictated to the court reporter “before the charge is read to the jury”).
213. Tamez, 443 S.W.3d at 842–43.
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objections that a trial court has discretion to shorten, provided it affords
the parties a reasonable time to inspect and object to the charge.214
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the preservation of jury charge
error in Burbage v. Burbage.215 Burbage involved a defamation action
between brothers, and the defendant (who was pro se) contended that six
of the ten statements at issue were qualifiedly privileged, as they were
made in letters he sent to individuals who had interests “sufficiently af-
fected by the communication.”216 The trial court submitted the ten state-
ments to the jury for a determination of whether the statements were
substantially true and it also included a broad-form question on damages
that integrated the jury’s findings on the ten statements. But in the event
the qualified privilege applied to any of the statements, the trial court’s
damages questions might have improperly incorporated both valid and
invalid bases for liability raising the possibility of harmful error.217 After
the court of appeals held the defendant had waived any complaint by
failing to object to the submission of the broad-form damages question,
the defendant appealed, contending that his qualified privilege objection
preserved error with respect to the derivative damages question.218 The
supreme court disagreed, finding that the applicable rules of procedure
require the complaining party to point out the objectionable matter, set
forth the grounds of the objection, and secure a ruling from the trial
court.219 According to the supreme court, it was incumbent on the defen-
dant to communicate to the trial court that it was improper to submit the
six statements that were the subject of the qualified privilege to the jury,
but since he failed to specifically detail his complaint regarding the liabil-
ity question and did not challenge the form of the broad-form damages
question, he waived any complaint.220
The trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction was at issue in Telesis/
Parkwood Retirement I, Ltd. v. Anderson.221 The plaintiff sustained inju-
ries in a fall in the shower of an independent-retirement community
owned by the defendant, and the jury found in her favor on her negli-
gence and gross negligence claims. On appeal, the defendant alleged that
the trial court erred by instructing the jury to answer a broad-form negli-
gence question rather than one based on a negligent undertaking, while
the plaintiff contended the defendant had failed to preserve its challenge
to the broad-form question.222 The El Paso Court of Appeals noted that
the basic test “for determining whether a party has preserved error in the
214. Id. at 843. The supreme court then found that the defendant had preserved error
by objecting prior to the time the charge was read to the jury and securing a ruling from
the trial judge but nonetheless held that the time afforded was reasonable. Id. at 845.
215. 447 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Tex. 2014).
216. Id. at 254 (quoting Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. 1994)).
217. Id. at 255 (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex. 2000)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 256 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 274; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1).
220. Id. at 257–58.
221. 462 S.W.3d 212, 232 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
222. Id. at 232.
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jury charge” is “whether the party made the trial court aware of the com-
plaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling.”223 Because the defen-
dant had requested a granulated question and objected to the submission
of the broad-form question, the court of appeals found that the defendant
had preserved error.224 The court of appeals, however, then held that
“the trial court did not abuse its discretion,” as the plaintiff’s claims,
properly construed, were for negligence based upon one or more duties
arising from an ordinary duty of care, not negligent undertaking.225
XII. JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court clarified and addressed what constitutes
“compensatory damages” for purposes of suspending the execution of a
money judgment on appeal pursuant to § 52.006 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code and Rule 24 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
in In re Longview Energy Co.226 In this case, plaintiff oil company filed
suit against two members of its own board of directors, as well as their
separately owned entities. The oil company alleged the two directors had
breached their fiduciary duties after it learned that the board members
and their entities were pursuing the same prospects that plaintiff oil com-
pany was pursuing in the south Texas Eagle Ford shale. The jury found
that the board members breached their fiduciary duty and that their enti-
ties had knowingly participated; thus, the defendants collectively had
“wrongfully obtain[ed] assets in the Eagle Ford shale.”227 The plaintiff oil
company sought disgorgement but not damages. In addition to creating a
constructive trust for the assets defendants acquired in the Eagle Ford
shale, the trial court originally awarded plaintiff a monetary award of
$95.5 million “based on the jury’s finding regarding the value of past-
production revenues derived from the [assets] . . . minus the amount the
jury found that the defendants paid to acquire [the assets,] . . . but with-
out credit for” development or production expenses related to such reve-
nues.228 The trial court subsequently amended the judgment to omit this
statement such that there was no explanation for the final judgment’s
$95.5 million monetary award. The defendants appealed, posting a $25
million bond as security to stay enforcement of the trial court’s judgment.
They then moved for relief from any additional security requirement,
which the trial court denied but a divided court of appeals found should
have been granted.229 On mandamus review by the supreme court, the
defendants argued they need not post security for the monetary award in
the judgment because the award “[did] not constitute ‘compensatory
223. Id. at 233 (quoting State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d
235, 241 (Tex. 1992)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 234.
226. 464 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2015).
227. Id. at 356.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 356–57.
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damages.’”230 The supreme court agreed, holding that “in no sense can
the monetary award . . . be said to be compensatory,” and that it was
instead punitive.231 Likening the award to attorneys’ fees, the supreme
court explained that disgorgement damages are compensatory like attor-
ney’s fees, interest, and costs are, but cannot be considered compensatory
damages within the meaning of § 52.006.232 Accordingly, the supreme
court concluded that the defendants were not required to post security on
that portion of the judgment.233
XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In the prior Survey period, in In re Columbia Medical Center of Las
Colinas, the Texas Supreme Court announced the rule that when a trial
court grants a motion for new trial, it must articulate a reasonably specific
basis for doing so beyond “in the interest of justice and fairness.”234 The
purpose of this rule is to allow the court of appeals to conduct a merits-
based mandamus review of the trial court’s articulated reasons for grant-
ing the new trial.235 During this Survey period, Texas courts analyzed the
sufficiency of new trial orders under this precedent. In In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours and Company, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the
trial court’s new trial order met this burden.236 The order was six pages
long, and while not exhaustive, the order listed multiple examples of evi-
dence from the record supporting the trial court’s grant of a new trial.
The order also claimed that a new trial was proper because the cited evi-
dence was “of such great weight and preponderance.”237 While the court
of appeals ultimately disagreed with the trial court’s rationale for order-
ing a new trial, it held the trial court’s order was sufficiently specific to
allow the defendant to use a mandamus proceeding to attack the new
trial order.238 But the court of appeals found the trial court’s stated rea-
sons were not legitimate and held the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the motion for new trial.239
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In In re RSR Corp., the Texas Supreme Court held the law firm of
Bickel & Brewer was improperly disqualified based on lower courts’ ap-
230. Id. at 360.
231. Id. at 360–61.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 361.
234. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding).
235. See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 755–59 (Tex. 2013)
(orig. proceeding).
236. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 463 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Beau-
mont, 2015, orig. proceeding).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 86, 96.
239. Id. at 96.
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plication of the incorrect legal standard.240 The trial and appellate courts
applied the “bright-line rule” of In re American Home Products Corp.241
The courts concluded that Bickel & Brewer should be disqualified after it
met with a former executive of the adverse party, who was in possession
of former employer’s confidential information, “at least 19 times, for a
total of more than 150 hours.”242 The supreme court explained that the
former finance manager of the adverse party was also a witness,243 not
only a non-lawyer “directly supervised by attorneys . . . retained to assist
in litigation,” thus the American Home Products screening rule did not
apply.244 Instead, the supreme court held that the lower courts should
have analyzed the firm’s potential disqualification for receipt of an adver-
sary’s privileged and confidential information from a former employee
fact witness under the factors outlined by In re Meador.245 The supreme
court reasoned that treating a fact witness like “a side-switching em-
ployee that American Home Products contemplated” would restrict infor-
mal discovery and hinder attorneys’ ability to gather relevant facts from
witnesses with firsthand knowledge.246 Additionally, the supreme court
noted that attorneys who improperly solicit privileged or confidential in-
formation from fact witnesses could be disqualified under In re Mea-
dor.247 Having found an abuse of discretion, the supreme court
conditionally granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate
240. In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding).
241. See In re Am. Home Products Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 74–75 (Tex. 1998) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (holding law firm that hired its opposing counsel’s former legal assistant must be
disqualified unless hiring law firm has screening measures in place because of presumption
paralegals and legal assistants who have worked on case have received confidences and will
share those confidences with new employer).
242. In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d at 777.
243. The following facts were significant to the supreme court’s determination the exec-
utive was a fact witness: the former executive’s position with the employer “existed inde-
pendently of litigation” and he did not report primarily to the former employer’s in-house
or outside attorneys. See id. at 780.
244. Id. at 780–82.
245. Id. at 778–79. These factors include:
1) whether the attorney knew or should have known the material was
privileged;
2) the promptness with which the attorney notifies the opposing side that he
or she has received its privileged information;
3) the extent to which the attorney reviews and digests the privileged
information;
4) the significance of the privileged information; i.e., the extent to which the
its disclosure may prejudice the movant’s claim or defense, and the extent
to which return of the documents will mitigate that prejudice;
5) the extent to which the movant may be at fault for the unauthorized
disclosure;
6) the extent to which the nonmovant will suffer prejudice from the disquali-
fication of his or her attorney.
Id. at 779 (quoting In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)).
246. Id. at 780–81.
247. Id. at 781 (citing Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.02, cmt. 4, noting
the rule did not prohibit attorneys from communicating with former employees of an or-
ganization as client).
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its order disqualifying Bickel & Brewer.248
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
In Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, the Texas Supreme Court re-
solved a split among the courts of appeals as to whether Chapter 74 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires an expert report for garden
variety slip-and-fall claims against a health care provider.249 Based on
language in a 2012 Texas Supreme Court opinion, a minority of the courts
of appeals had held that an expert report was required for all safety re-
lated claims.250 Applying other supreme court precedents, the majority
view held that not “all safety claims that occur in a health care setting—
even claims that are otherwise completely untethered from health
care”—require a report under Chapter 74.251 In Ross, the supreme court
rejected the minority view, explaining:
[F]or a safety standards-based claim to be a [health care liability
claim subject to Chapter 74] . . . there must be a substantive nexus
between the safety standards allegedly violated and the provision of
health care. And that nexus must be more than a ‘but for’ relation-
ship. . . . The pivotal issue in a safety-standards-based claim is
whether the standards on which the claim is based implicate the de-
fendant’s duties as a health care provider, including its duties to pro-
vide for patient safety.252
Concluding that a hospital visitor’s fall on recently waxed floors outside
the patient treatment areas did not satisfy this nexus test (under seven
non-exclusive considerations), the supreme court reversed and
remanded.253
248. Id. at 782. The supreme court did not decide whether Bickel & Brewer’s disqualifi-
cation would have been proper under the correct In re Meador standard since the trial
court had not addressed the issue and “did not resolve all fact issues relevant” to that
analysis. Id.
249. Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015).
250. See id. at 499; Tex. West Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 186 (Tex.
2012); Williams v. Riverside Gen. Hosp., Inc., No. 01-13-00335-CV, 2014 WL 4259889, at
*4–7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 28, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (cataloging opin-
ions and adopting the majority view).
251. Riverside Gen. Hosp., Inc., 2014 WL 4259889, at *7.
252. Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 504–05.
253. Id. at 505–06. The supreme court suggested the following set of non-exclusive
factors:
1) Did the alleged negligence of the defendant occur in the course of the
defendant’s performing tasks with the purpose of protecting patients from
harm;
2) Did the injuries occur in a place where patients might be during the time
they were receiving care, so that the obligation of the provider to protect
persons who require special medical care was implicated;
3) At the time of the injury, was the claimant in the process of seeking or
receiving health care;
4) At the time of the injury, was the claimant providing or assisting in pro-
viding health care;
5) Is the alleged negligence based on safety standards arising from profes-
sional duties owed by the health care provider;
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XVI. CONCLUSION
The Texas Legislature has narrowed the scope of the Texas-resident-
plaintiff exception to the forum nonconveniens statute in response to
Texas decisions, and how those amendments will fare in practice of apply-
ing the exception remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Texas Su-
preme Court and intermediate courts of appeals will continue to grapple
with new Rule 91a of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing motion to
dismiss practice and continue to expand precedent on existing procedural
rules to guide the trial courts in properly managing their dockets.
6) If an instrumentality was involved in the defendant’s alleged negligence,
was it a type used in providing health care; or
7) Did the alleged negligence occur in the course of the defendant’s taking
action or failing to take action necessary to comply with safety-related
requirements set for health care providers by governmental or accrediting
agencies?
Id. at 505.
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